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COMMENT  
 
Sarei v. Rio Tinto: How an Exhaustion 
Requirement for the Alien Tort Statute Will 
Further Exhaust Remedies for Environmental 
Injuries  
 
CHERYL CORTEMEGLIA* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Many new gold mines opened during the 1980s as gold prices 
increased after the deregulation of gold in 1971.1 In the past decade, 
the global price of gold quadrupled, which has created an intensified 
demand for gold mining throughout the world in new locations.2 This 
rapid increase in gold mining is adversely impacting humans and 
ecosystems.3 Most commercial gold mining occurs by open-pit 
mining, where mining companies blast rock and form large craters.4 
Mining entities can extract gold by either agitation, amalgamation by 
adding mercury, or leaching the gold by pouring sodium cyanide over 
the crushed ore.5 Both mercury and cyanide are extremely harmful to 
humans and the environment.6   
 
      *  Executive Articles Editor, Maryland Journal of International Law 2010–
2011; J.D., University of Maryland School of Law, May 2011.  
 1. HAROLD KIRKEMO ET AL., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, GOLD 6, available at 
http://pubs.usgs.gov/gip/gold/gold.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2011).   
 2. Brook Larmer, The Real Price of Gold: In Dollars and Suffering, It’s Never 
Been Higher, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, Jan. 2009, at 34, 42. 
 3. See generally id. 
 4. Christine R. Thompson, A Multifaceted Approach to the Regulation of 
Cyanide in Gold Mining Operations, 29 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 79, 84 
(2005) (citation omitted).   
 5. KIRKEMO ET AL., supra note 1, at 8; Thompson, supra note 4, at 84 & n.26. 
 6. Larmer, supra note 2, at 60 (reporting that mercury causes severe damage to 
all major organs and the nervous system); Thompson, supra note 4, at 86–87 & 
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The gold mining industry is comprised of large multinational 
corporations that operate in developing and developed countries.7 
The gold mining process has polluted the local waters in many 
countries.8 Many nations often do not effectively enforce or interpret 
their laws and regulations against transnational corporations because 
they do not want them to leave with jobs and money.9 As a result, 
some environmentally-injured plaintiffs have brought lawsuits in the 
defendants’ home jurisdictions. One way U.S. federal courts can 
assert subject matter jurisdiction over foreign plaintiffs’ tort suits is 
the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).10   
In Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC,11 an ATS suit against a gold mining 
company, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en 
banc, established a prudential exhaustion doctrine requiring the 
district court to apply a three-part test to determine if plaintiffs must 
exhaust local remedies before proceeding in U.S. courts.12 In so 
holding, the plurality acted without explicit or unambiguous guidance 
from Congress, the U.S. Supreme Court, or international law,13 and 
imposed a redundant and less effective doctrine that will require 
further litigation.14 Despite the test’s third part, this new requirement 
could expose parties to corruption, put suffering plaintiffs in danger, 
fail to conserve judicial resources, and impede justice.15 To 
 
n.34 (noting that cyanide levels as low as one microgram per liter can be lethal in 
fish and, in humans, damages the thyroid gland and causes fetal malformations in 
pregnant women). 
 7. Thompson, supra note 4, at 79; Benjamin J. Richardson, Protecting 
Indigenous Peoples Through Socially Responsible Investment, 6 INDIGENOUS L.J. 
205, 221 (2007); Larmer, supra note 2, at 50. 
 8. Larmer, supra note 2, at 60 (mentioning mercury contamination 100 miles 
away from a gold mine source). 
 9. Tracy M. Schmidt, Comment, Transnational Corporate Responsibility for 
International Environmental and Human Rights Violations: Will the United 
Nations’ “Norms” Provide the Required Means?, 36 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 217, 218 
(2005). 
 10. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006); see Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 626 F. 
Supp. 2d 377, 387–89 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).   
 11. 550 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
 12. Id. at 824. 
 13. See infra Part V.C.1. 
 14. See infra Part V.A–B, D.  
 15. See infra Part V.C.2. 
CHERYL 11/30/2011  6:18 PM 
2011] SAREI V. RIO TINTO 195 
 
effectively prevent and reduce extreme environmental damage, the 
United States and other countries should maintain all avenues of 
deterrence and liability, e.g., the laws and jurisdiction of the affected 
state and the corporation’s home state. If the Ninth Circuit had 
allowed the political branches to decide this issue with individual 
countries, the court would have more faithfully preserved separation 
of powers and foreign relations doctrines, reduced administrative 
costs, and maintained the statute’s underlying policies. To ensure 
justice, courts should at least consider the gravity of the alleged 
tortious acts, stay U.S. suits, and apply equitable tolling.16  
II. THE DISTRICT COURT AND NINTH CIRCUIT PANEL DECISIONS 
In the 1960s, a British corporation and an Australian corporation 
(collectively “Rio Tinto”), as part of an international mining group 
headquartered in London, decided to build a copper and gold mine in 
Panguna village on Bougainville in Papua New Guinea (PNG).17 Rio 
Tinto established a PNG majority-owned subsidiary called 
Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL),18 which entered into a formal 
agreement with the PNG government to regulate mine waste 
pollution and disposal.19 While operating the mine, Rio Tinto 
allegedly destroyed large sections of rain forest and a river valley, 
produced more than one billion tons of waste rock, and polluted 
drinking and bathing water, a river, and a bay.20 Local citizens 
protested the environmental degradation and blew up the mine’s 
infrastructure and machinery.21 In response to BCL threats to 
withdraw investments, the PNG government sent in defense forces.22 
Rio Tinto supplied vehicles, transported troops, and provided 
 
 16. See infra Part V.D.2. 
 17. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1121 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
 18. Id. at 1121. 
 19. Id. at 1121–22.  
 20. Id. at 1122–24, 1162. When the mine opened in 1972 it was about seven 
kilometers wide and one-half kilometer deep. Id. at 1122. The tailings and 
chemicals from the copper concentrator were dumped into the river. Id. at 1123. 
The chemicals from the concentrator contained aluminum, arsenic, cadmium, 
copper, lead, and mercury. Id. at 1123 n.31. 
 21. Id. at 1124–25.  
 22. Id. at 1126. The mine provided eighteen percent of PNG’s total annual 
revenue and ten percent of its GDP. Id. at 1125–26 n.60. 
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economic assistance.23 After the PNG army killed many civilians, a 
civil war ensued for ten years that killed more than ten thousand 
civilians.24 PNG formalized a peace accord to end the war in 2002.25 
On November 2, 2000, Alexis Sarei, a California resident who lived 
on Bougainville between 1973 and 1987, and twenty-one PNG 
residents filed a class action in the U.S. District Court for the Central 
District of California asserting human rights and international 
environmental claims under the ATS.26  
The U.S. District Court held that the ATS did not have an 
exhaustion of local remedies prerequisite based on (1) the ATS’s text 
and legislative history, (2) that domestic law does not impose the 
requirements of international law or other nations’ laws, and (3) that 
Congress did not intend to impose an exhaustion requirement on ATS 
claims that fall outside the scope of the Torture Victim Protection Act 
(TVPA).27 It held that it had subject matter jurisdiction as the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) represented 
the “law of nations” for ATS jurisdiction.28 Plaintiffs asserted 
violations of UNCLOS Articles 194(2) and 207, which require States 
to take all measures and adopt laws and regulations to prevent and 
reduce marine pollution.29 It represented the law of nations because 
the U.S. signed it, 166 nations have ratified it, and the Supreme Court 
stated the United States “has recognized that its baseline provisions 
 
 23. Id. at 1126. 
 24. Id. at 1126–27.  
 25. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 550 F.3d 822, 825 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
 26. Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1127; Sarei, 550 F.3d at 825–26. Courts also call 
the statute the Alien Tort Claims Act. 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1130 n.90. 
 27. Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1135–39, 1162.   
 28. Id. at 1131, 1162.  
 29. See id. at 1161; U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, arts. 194(2), 207 
opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3, 478–79, 481–82 [hereinafter 
UNCLOS] (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994), available at http://treaties.un. 
org/doc/Treaties/1994/11/19941116%2005-26%20AM/Ch_XXI_06p.pdf. PNG 
ratified it on Jan. 14, 1997. United Nations, United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION (Apr. 19, 2011), http://treaties.un.org/ 
pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?&src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI~6&chapter=21 
&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en. 
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reflect customary international law” and are binding on all signatory 
and non-signatory nations.30  
The district court declined to dismiss the case under the forum 
non conveniens doctrine because the case was brought under the ATS 
and alleges violations of international, not PNG, law and although 
PNG was an adequate forum because defendants were amenable to 
process, the claims were cognizable, contingency fees were available, 
lawyers were able to advance costs,31 and it deferred to the plaintiff’s 
forum selection as the U.S. Supreme Court has recommended,32 
especially as the plaintiffs could face “grave harm” in PNG and 
might not be able to secure counsel nor compel the production of 
critical witnesses or documents in PNG.33 The district court 
dismissed the UNCLOS claim on act of state grounds because if Rio 
Tinto was a state actor due to its connection with the government, it 
would have to adjudicate PNG’s official acts.34 It dismissed all of the 
claims under the political question doctrine for the same reasons and 
because it might announce a view contrary to the Attorney General’s 
Statement of Interest and thus would “express a lack of respect” and 
cause “embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements.”35 The 
Statement of Interest declared continued adjudication risked the PNG 
peace process and hence foreign relations.36 The court dismissed the 
environmental claims under the international comity doctrine because 
of a threshold conflict between the ATS and PNG’s Compensation 
Act and the Statement of Interest shows that the U.S.’s interests are 
not inconsistent with PNG’s interest.37  
A three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit decided that U.S. courts had subject matter jurisdiction under 
the ATS,38 after the Supreme Court decided Sosa v. Alvarez-
 
 30. Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1161. 
 31. Id. at 1165–66, 1169–70, 1175. 
 32. Id. at 1172. 
 33. Id. at 1173–74. 
 34. Id. at 1188. 
 35. Id. at 1181, 1196–99, 1208–09.   
 36. Id. at 1181. 
 37. Id. at 1201, 1204–07. 
 38. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1203 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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Machain.39 The panel further held that the district court erred in 
dismissing all of the claims under the political question doctrine.40 
None of the Baker factors were implicated because resolution of ATS 
claims had been constitutionally entrusted to the judiciary, little U.S. 
involvement meant the claims “merely ‘touch[ed] foreign relations,’” 
the Executive Branch did not explicitly request dismissal, and 
subsequent PNG government letters suggested a different reality in 
PNG.41 The panel vacated to the district court for reconsideration of 
the dismissals of the UNCLOS claim under the act of state Sabbatino 
policies and international comity Restatement (Third) of Foreign 
Relations Law section 403(2) factors because the Statement of 
Interest did not implicate great foreign policy concerns.42 The panel 
affirmed the district court’s conclusion that no exhaustion 
requirement presently existed and deferred to Congress or the 
Supreme Court to impose one, if warranted.43 The panel relied on the 
following reasons: The ATS’s text contained no explicit requirement, 
the legislative history of the ATS was silent, and a treaty signed six 
years after Congress enacted the ATS did require exhaustion;44 
Congress’s placement of an exhaustion requirement in the 1991 
Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), but not altering or 
mentioning a similar requirement for the ATS suggests 
ambiguousness or that Congress did not intend an ATS exhaustion 
requirement;45 Congress stated that the ATS should “remain ‘intact’ 
and ‘unchanged’” and the TVPA was a specific act unlike the general 
ATS.46 The panel failed to prudentially require exhaustion for the 
following reasons: the Supreme Court has called for judicial caution; 
the ATS’s “law of nations” language applies to substantive, not 
procedural, international law; international law has only required 
exhaustion in international tribunals; rulings might encourage foreign 
countries to improve their legal systems; and exhaustion would 
 
 39. 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
 40. Sarei, 487 F.3d at 1197.  
 41. Id. at 1204, 1207 & n.15. 
 42. Id. at 1197, 1210, 1213.   
 43. Id. at 1197.  
 44. Id. at 1214–15. 
 45. Id. at 1218. 
 46. Id. 
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necessitate “sensitive inquiries into the internal affairs of other 
countries.”47  
Judge Bybee dissented because he would have affirmed the 
district court’s dismissal of the suit, but on different grounds; he 
would have required plaintiffs exhaust local remedies before 
proceeding in U.S. courts.48 He contended that Congress had not 
statutorily precluded exhaustion, international norms and law 
required exhaustion, and, alternatively, judicial discretion should 
require exhaustion to promote comity, preserve separation of powers 
in the realm of foreign affairs, allow foreign courts to apply their 
expertise and correct procedural errors, refine issues, develop the 
record, and prevent diplomatic and local tensions.49 He said that if the 
exhaustion requirement in the TVPA was a new requirement, 
Congress would have commented on it.50 He stated the Sosa Court 
urged caution only to prevent adverse foreign policy consequences 
and limitations on foreign government power over their own 
citizens.51  
Before the district court reconsidered its UNCLOS claim 
dismissals under the act of state and international comity doctrines, 
the Ninth Circuit ordered the case be heard en banc.52 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Courts have applied strenuous barriers to ATS suits in terms of 
subject matter jurisdiction53 and justiciability doctrines.54 U.S. courts 
have not previously used an exhaustion doctrine to dismiss an ATS 
suit.55 
 
 47. Id. at 1219–23, 1222 n.33. 
 48. Id. at 1224–25, 1246 (Bybee, J., dissenting).  
 49. Id. at 1225–26, 1238–39. 
 50. Id. at 1228. 
 51. Id. at 1230 n.7. 
 52. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 499 F.3d 923, 924 (9th Cir. 2007), reh’g granted, 
550 F.3d 822, 826 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
 53. See infra Part III.A. 
 54. See infra Part III.B-C. 
 55. See infra Part III.D. 
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A.   Subject Matter Jurisdiction for the Alien Tort Requires 
Violation of a U.S. Treaty or the “Law of Nations” 
The Alien Tort Statute provides jurisdiction for tort suits brought 
by foreigners alleging violations of a U.S. treaty or the “law of 
nations.” The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the “Power . . . To 
define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, 
and Offenses against the Law of Nations” and grants jurisdiction to 
federal courts over federal questions and over suits between a U.S. 
citizen or state and a foreign citizen or state.56 Pursuant to these 
jurisdictional grants, in 1789, Congress enacted the Alien Tort Statute 
(ATS), which provides U.S. federal district courts with “original 
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed 
in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”57 A 
treaty must be self-executing and sufficiently specific unless 
Congress specifically creates a cause of action to bring an ATS suit.58 
Courts have debated if the “law of nations” is composed of 
“definable, obligatory (rather than hortatory) and universally 
condemned” torts or only jus cogens norms.59 In 1980, in the often-
cited Filartiga v. Pena-Irala opinion,60 the Second Circuit concluded 
 
 56. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10, art. III, § 2. 
 57. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d 
Cir. 1980). 
 58. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW § 111(3)–(4) (1987). 
 59. Pauline Abadie, A New Story of David and Goliath: The Alien Tort Claims 
Act Gives Victims of Environmental Injustice in the Developing World a Viable 
Claim Against Multinational Corporations, 34 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 745, 
764–67 (2004); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1304 (C.D. Cal. 2000), 
rev’d in part and remanded, 395 F.3d 932, 945 & n.15 (9th Cir. 2002). Jus cogens 
norms are those that are “accepted and recognized by the international community 
of states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which 
can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the 
same character.” Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 557 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1098 (N.D. Cal. 
2008) (citing Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 
1992) (quoting Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 53, May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (entered into force on Jan. 27, 
1980))).  
 60. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
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that courts must interpret customary international law as it has 
evolved and exists among the world’s nations today.61  
Since Filartiga, courts have found that international 
environmental agreements, U.S. domestic environmental law, the 
Restatement (Third), and non-intentional cultural genocide resulting 
from environmental damage do not constitute “the law of nations.”  
In 1991 in Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp.,62 in a case between two 
U.S. corporations involving the shipment of toxic materials to a 
foreign country, the Southern District of New York concluded that 
Stockholm Declaration Principle 21 and Restatement (Third) section 
602(2) do not constitute the law of nations because Principle 21 was 
only a general responsibility to avoid environmental harm outside a 
state’s borders and the Restatement reflected U.S. views, not 
universal views, on environmental law.63 Three years later in a suit 
by Ecuadoran plaintiffs against a U.S. oil company for oil 
contamination in their country, that court found that U.S. 
environmental statutes were only evidence of U.S. adherence to 
international commitments to control pollution.64  
In 1999, the Fifth Circuit in Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc.65 
concluded that cultural genocide from gold mine pollution of water 
and vegetation is not a violation of the law of nations because the 
plaintiff failed to allege purposeful destruction of the indigenous 
society, and cultural genocide is not a universally accepted norm.66 
 
 61. Id. at 881. Customary international law is “defined as international norms 
that most States have adopted and recognized as mandatory legal obligations.” 
Bradford Mank, Can Plaintiffs Use Multinational Environmental Treaties as 
Customary International Law to Sue Under the Alien Tort Statute?, 2007 UTAH L. 
REV. 1085, 1090 (2007). 
 62. 775 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 63. Id. at 671, 669–71 & n.2; United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 3–14, 1992, Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development, princ. 2, A/CONF.151/26 (Vol.1) (June 14, 1992) 
[hereinafter Rio Declaration], available at http://www.un-documents.net/rio-
dec.htm.  
 64. See Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., No. 93 Civ. 7527 (VLB), 1994 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 4718, at *23–25 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1994), dismissed, 142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 
554 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), modified and aff’d, 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 65. Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 66. Id. at 163–68. 
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That court also held that the polluter pays, precautionary, and 
proximity principles do not constitute the law of nations because they 
are only general responsibilities “devoid of articulable or discernible 
standards and regulations to identify practices that constitute 
international environmental abuses or torts.”67 It alluded that it would 
have reached a different decision for transboundary harm.68 In 2001 
and 2003, in Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Co.,69 in a suit against a 
copper mine company for Peruvians’ respiratory illnesses from intra-
national pollution, the Southern District of New York and Second 
Circuit determined that the Rio Declaration Principle 1 failed to 
constitute the law of nations because it is also too vague to identify 
the prohibited conduct.70  It further held that Rio Declaration 
Principle 2 recognizes that nations have the sovereign right to exploit 
their own resources and general statements of rights to life and health 
in three human rights international agreements are too vague.71 
In 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain72 
limited the ATS’s scope as a jurisdictional statute that created no new 
causes of action and as “based on the present-day law of nations 
[that] rest on a norm of international character accepted by the 
civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the 
features of the 18th-century paradigms we have recognized.”73 Those 
18th century paradigms were offenses against ambassadors, violation 
of safe conducts, and piracy.74 Justice Breyer mentioned that U.S. 
courts have recognized crimes against humanity, genocide, slavery, 
torture, and war crimes as rising to such a level.75 Subsequent to 
Sosa, the Central District of California in Sarei followed Amlon 
 
 67. Id. at 167; see Rio Declaration, supra note 63, princs. 14, 15, 16 for 
definitions of the polluter pays, precautionary, and proximity principles. 
 68. Beanal, 197 F.3d at 167 & n.6. 
 69. Flores v. S. Peru Copper Co., 253 F. Supp. 2d 510 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d, 
414 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 70. Id. at 519, 521–25, aff’d, 414 F.3d at 254–55. “Human beings are . . . 
entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature.” Rio Declaration, 
supra note 63, princ. 1. 
 71. Flores, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 519, 521–25, aff’d, 414 F.3d at 254–55.  
 72. 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
 73. Id. at 725.  
 74. Id. at 715. 
 75. Id. at 762 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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Metals and Flores to find that the Stockholm Declaration Principle 21 
and the analogous Rio Declaration Principle 2 do not qualify as the 
law of nations.76 
B.   U.S. Courts have Dismissed ATS Claims, Including 
Environmental Claims, for Justiciability Reasons 
Courts have dismissed ATS cases for justiciability reasons, 
including the forum non conveniens, political question, act of state, 
and international comity doctrines.  
Forum non conveniens is a conflict of law principle that permits 
a forum to cede jurisdiction to a more adequate forum that is both 
more convenient and will better ensure serving the goals of justice.77 
U.S. courts apply a two-part analysis in which they: (1) determine if 
an alternative forum is available, and (2) determine if the alternative 
forum is adequate.78 Courts evaluate the private interests of the 
litigants and the public interests.79 The private interests include the 
sources of proof, availability of compulsory process for witnesses, 
cost of obtaining willing witnesses, possibility to view relevant 
premises, and other practical problems that make trial expeditious, 
easy, and inexpensive.80 The public interests include the 
administrative burden on alternative courts, burden of jury duty on a 
community not related to the litigation, the law to be applied, and the 
local interest in the case’s outcome.81  
U.S. courts dismissed the Aguinda Ecuadoran oil pollution and 
Flores Peruvian copper pollution ATS cases because of access to 
evidence and witnesses who speak many dialects and lower burdens 
on less-related jurors and courts and Peru allowed contingent fee 
arrangements, was not too corrupt, and Peruvian law likely would 
 
 76. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1156–60 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
 77. Simon Chesterman, The Turn to Ethics: Disinvestment from Multinational 
Corporations for Human Rights Violations–The Case of Norway’s Sovereign 
Wealth Fund, 23 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 577, 597 (2008). 
 78. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 & n.22 (1981).   
 79. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 508–09. 
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control.82 The Ninth Circuit failed to dismiss a non-ATS case 
alleging common law torts for oil byproduct water pollution because 
(1) Peru was not more convenient because of the substantive and 
procedural law, barriers confronting indigenous plaintiffs, possible 
lack of more than nominal damages, and dismissal of 126 corrupted 
judges in 2007 from widespread lobbying and improper favors, (2) a 
strong presumption for plaintiff’s choice, (3) the district court abused 
its discretion in dismissing without imposing mitigating conditions, 
such as requiring waiver of statute of limitations and enforceability of 
Peruvian judgment defenses, and (4) the non-profit organization co-
plaintiffs were headquartered in California and California was the 
location of business decisions.83  
Under the political question doctrine a court assesses if 
adjudication is appropriate or may interfere with the legislative or 
executive branches’ constitutional or policy authority.84 In Baker v. 
Carr,85 the Supreme Court articulated six factors to consider: the 
textual constitutional commitment of an issue to a political 
department, lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards 
to resolve the issue, requirement of an initial non-judicial policy 
determination, lack of respect to coordinate branches from 
adjudication, need to adhere to a political decision made, and 
embarrassment potential from various departments’ 
pronouncements.86 Baker cautioned against implying that all 
questions involving foreign relations are political questions.87 In 
Japan Whaling Ass’n v. American Cetacean Society,88 the Supreme 
 
 82. Aguinda v. Texaco, 303 F.3d 470, 473–80 (2d Cir. 2002); Flores v. S. Peru 
Copper Corp., 253 F. Supp. 2d 510, 526–44 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d on other 
grounds, 414 F.3d 233, 266 (2d Cir. 2003). Two other tort cases arising from 
environmental harm were dismissed on similar forum non conveniens grounds. In 
re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec., 1984, 634 F. 
Supp. 842, 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), modified, 809 F.2d 195, 205–06 (2d Cir. 1987); 
Torres v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 965 F. Supp. 899, 909 (S.D. Tex. 1996). 
 83. Carijano v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 548 F. Supp. 2d 823, 835 (C.D. 
Cal. 2008), rev’d, 626 F.3d 1137, 1147–48, 1151–52, 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 2010).  
 84. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).   
 85. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).   
 86. Id. at 217.   
 87. Id. at 211.  
 88. 478 U.S. 221 (1986). 
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Court held that despite the dominance of the Executive Branch over 
foreign relations matters, U.S. courts have the authority to interpret 
treaties and executive agreements.89 In 2005, the Ninth Circuit in 
Alperin v. Vatican Bank90 found this doctrine did not bar ATS claims 
because the suit implicated none of the Baker factors as courts often 
handle cases involving international elements.91 Some courts have 
dismissed ATS claims, however, for the lack of respect factor if the 
Executive has established agreements and alternative forums for 
compensation or if they are foreseeable.92  
The judicially-created act of state doctrine allows a court to 
respect foreign states by refusing to sit in judgment and declare 
invalid the acts of another state committed within its territory.93 The 
U.S. Constitution and international law do not compel the doctrine, 
but it possesses constitutional underpinnings—separation of powers 
concerns of the Executive’s foreign relations authority.94 In Banco de 
Nacional De Cuba v. Sabbatino,95 the Court enunciated three factors 
courts should consider—the degree of codification or consensus of 
the particular area of international law, the importance for our foreign 
relations, and whether or not the perpetrating government still 
exists.96 Most cases that proceeded without this doctrine precluding it 
involved former officials no longer in power.97 The doctrine applies 
 
 89. Id. at 230 (holding that the political question doctrine did not prevent 
adjudication of whether the Secretary of Commerce could repudiate a whaling 
convention).  
 90. 410 F.3d 532 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 91. Id. at 554, 558. 
 92. See Vietnam Ass’n for Victims of Agent Orange/Dioxin v. Dow Chem. Co. 
(In re Agent Orange Product Liab. Litig.), 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 72–79 (E.D.N.Y. 
2005), aff’d, 517 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 2008); Alperin, 410 F.3d at 554–58; 
Whiteman v. Dorotheum GmbH & Co KG, 431 F.3d 57, 73–74 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(similar dismissal for FSIA claim).   
 93. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 443 cmt. a (1987); 
Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897); First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco 
Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 763 (1972).   
 94. Banco de Nacional De Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 443 cmt. a (1987). 
 95. 376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
 96. Id. at 428, 436–37; see Doe I v. Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1295 (N.D. Cal. 
2004). 
 97. Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 1304.   
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only to valid acts of sovereign nations that do not violate the 
fundamental laws of the foreign sovereign.98 The act of state doctrine 
was inapplicable to ATS claims for environmental violations at an 
Indonesian gold mine because the court did not need to decide the 
validity of Indonesian government acts.99 In Doe I v. Qi,100 the 
Northern District of California dismissed ATS damage and injunctive 
claims because the suit was against sitting officials, but failed to 
dismiss a declaratory claim because of minimal interference with the 
Executive Branch.101 Two U.S. courts failed to dismiss claims for 
violations of jus cogens norms when the State Department 
disapproved and sanctioned the acts, despite that the violating 
government still existed or was investigating the acts.102  
Similarly, the judicially-created international comity doctrine 
allows courts to defer to competent foreign adjudication.103 In Hilton 
v. Guyot,104 the U.S. Supreme Court clarified it is unavailable when 
its application is contrary to that nation’s policy or prejudicial to its 
interests.105 The Court said that fraud, prejudice, violating the 
principles of international law, or violating the United States’s own 
comity are all reasons not to give foreign adjudication full credit and 
effect.106 The Restatement (Third) section 403 describes factors that 
courts should consider, including the interests of each state and 
degree of conflict in each state’s laws: (a) the location of the act and 
effects on the regulating state, (b) the connections between the 
regulating state and parties, (c) the importance of regulation to the 
regulating state, character of the regulated activity, extent other states 
regulate such activities, and general acceptance of such regulation, 
 
 98. Id. at 1292–93; Mank, supra note 61, at 1099; see Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 
630 F.2d 876, 889 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 99. Alomang v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., No. 96 Civ. 2139, 1996 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 15908, at *2, 16–17 (E.D. La. Oct. 17, 1996).  
 100. 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1306 (N.D. Cal. 2004).   
 101. Id. at 1264, 1306.   
 102. E.g., Nat’l Coal. Gov’t of the Union of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 
329, 334 n.1, 354 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96 
Civ. 8386 (KMW), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3293, at *92–94 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 103. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64, 205–06 (1895).   
 104. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).   
 105. Id. at 165.    
 106. Id. at 206.   
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(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or 
hurt, (e) the importance of the regulation to the international legal, 
political, or economic system, (f) the extent the regulation is 
consistent with international system traditions, (g) the extent another 
state may have interest in regulating, and (h) the likelihood of conflict 
with another state’s regulation.107 Justice Breyer suggested courts 
should apply the doctrine to limit ATS cases to universally 
condemned heinous crimes for which courts recognize universal 
jurisdiction.108 The Court in Hilton, however, stated the doctrine’s 
function is to promote justice between individuals and friendly 
interactions among sovereigns.109  
Two cases, including Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc.,110 were 
dismissed for international comity grounds when the parties were 
residents of a foreign state, the activity and harm occurred entirely in 
a foreign state, foreign enforcement of a U.S. judgment was 
questionable, the foreign State regulated the challenged conduct, U.S. 
litigation would have interfered with the foreign State’s sovereign 
right to control its territory, and the foreign State objected to U.S. 
jurisdiction.111 Two courts found U.S. companies’ executive 
decisions in New York insufficient to overcome the Sequihua or 
Restatement (Third) section 403 factors.112 Three courts determined 
that international comity may be required when a foreign state’s law 
would apply and there would be a conflict between domestic and 
foreign law.113 The Southern District of New York stated that if true 
 
 107. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403(2) (1987).   
 108. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 761–63 (2004) (Breyer, J., 
concurring). 
 109. See Hilton, 159 U.S. at 206. 
 110. 847 F. Supp. 61 (S.D. Tex. 1994). 
 111. E.g., id. at 63; Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153, 160–61 (2d Cir. 1998), 
vacated partly on these grounds, Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470, 480 & n.4 
(2d Cir. 2002).  
 112. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 625, 627–28 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d, 
303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002); Torres v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 965 F. Supp. 899, 
908–09 (S.D. Tex. 1996), aff’d, 113 F.3d 540, 542–44 (5th Cir. 1997). 
 113. See Chavez v. Carranza, 559 F.3d 486, 495 (6th Cir. 2009); Marsoner v. 
United States (In re Grand Jury Proceedings), 40 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(noting the conflict must be that the foreign law would bar compliance with the 
U.S. court order); In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 283 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
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conflict exists, the decision to dismiss depends on the degree of 
legitimate offense to the foreign State, steps the foreign sovereign 
took to address the issues, and the extent of the United States’s 
interest in the issues.114 That court found the lack of conflict was 
dispositive to the decision not to dismiss for international comity.115 
The Central District of California denied dismissal based on comity 
grounds when the United States had interests in adjudication, the 
foreign State’s interest was low, and the alternative forum was 
inadequate.116   
C.  U.S. Courts Have Used the International Abstention Doctrine 
to Stay Suits When Foreign Suits are Actually Pending 
The international abstention doctrine allows a court to stay or 
dismiss an action when parallel judicial proceedings are actually 
pending in a foreign court117 to protect the interests of foreign states 
and simplify issues while preserving rights and protecting parties. 
The international abstention doctrine is based on either the domestic 
Colorado River118 or Landis119 doctrines that consider judicial 
economy and fairness to parties.120 Under Colorado River, abstention 
is the exception for exceptional circumstances, not the rule.121 The 
Colorado River factors that courts balance are: (1) whether either 
court has assumed jurisdiction over a res, (2) the relative convenience 
 
 114. In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d at 283. 
 115. Id. at 285. 
 116. Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1161–64 
(C.D. Cal. 2005). Justice Breyer has stated that international comity concerns 
lessen when conduct involves a country’s own nationals. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 
542 U.S. 692, 761 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 117. Mujica, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 1157 (emphasis added).  
 118. Id. at 1157; Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 
800 (1976); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. 1, 13–17, 19 (1983); see also 
Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co. v. Granger, 883 F.2d 680, 685 (7th Cir. 1987); Finova 
Capital Corp. v. Ryan Helicopters U.S.A., Inc., 180 F.3d 896, 898 (7th Cir. 1999); 
Genesis of Ky., Inc. v. Creation Ministries Int’l, Ltd., 556 F.3d 459, 467 (6th Cir. 
2009). 
 119. Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248 (1936). 
 120. Jocelyn H. Bush, Comment, To Abstain or Not to Abstain?: A New 
Framework for Application of the Abstention Doctrine in International Parallel 
Proceedings, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 127, 130–31 & nn.15 & 17 (2008). 
 121. Mujica, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 1155, 1158 (citing Colo. River Water 
Conservation Dist., 424 U.S. at 813). 
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of the forums, (3) the desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation, (4) 
the order in which the forums obtained jurisdiction, (5) which law 
controls, (6) the adequacy of the parallel proceeding to protect the 
parties’ rights, (7) the relative progress of the proceedings in each 
court, and (8) the vexatious or contrived nature of the federal 
claim.122 In Landis, abstention was appropriate to settle issues in the 
case, “simplify” the issues, and consider the length of the stay and 
hardship or inequality with going forward with the claim.123  
Several U.S. courts have failed to abstain under Colorado River 
while foreign suits were pending. In Answers in Genesis of Kentucky, 
Inc. v. Creation Ministries International, Ltd.,124 the Sixth Circuit 
failed to abstain in a suit brought after an Australian defendant 
brought suit in Australian courts under Colorado River—the statute 
at issue did not clearly articulate policy against bifurcated litigation, 
both States were parties to the relevant international agreement, the 
Australian proceeding was in its initial stages of considering 
jurisdictional and venue defenses, witnesses resided in both States, 
the international law was unambiguous, and no sovereign was a 
party.125 Similarly, in General Motors Corp. v. Ignacio Lopez de 
Arriortua,126 the Eastern District of Michigan denied a stay of the 
U.S. proceeding under Colorado River while a German proceeding 
was pending because the claims were not identical as the German suit 
did not include Michigan common law or statutory claims and 
convenience and the parties’ interests weighed in favor of the U.S. 
forum.127 In Johns Hopkins Health System Corp. v. Al Reem General 
Trading & Co.’s Representation Establishment,128 the court declined 
to dismiss U.S. jurisdiction because the U.S. forum was more 
convenient for the plaintiffs and not inconvenient for the defendants, 
no piecemeal litigation existed, the United Arab Emirates case had 
 
 122. See id. at 1158; Finova Capital Corp., 180 F.3d at 898, 900 (citing Colo. 
River Water Conservation Dist., 424 U.S. at 818; Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 
U.S. at 23, 26; Sverdup Corp. v. Edwardsville Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 7, 125 
F.3d 546, 549–50 (7th Cir. 1997)).   
 123. Bush, supra note 120, at 141–42. 
 124. 556 F.3d 459 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 125. Id. at 467–69. 
 126. 948 F. Supp. 656 (E.D. Mich. 1996). 
 127. Id. at 669. 
 128. 374 F. Supp. 2d 465, 474 (D. Md. 2005). 
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not progressed much, Washington D.C. contract law applied, and the 
United Arab Emirates proceedings were not adequate to protect the 
parties’ rights.129 The proceedings were inadequate to protect parties’ 
rights because the court had not addressed a forgery issue, it spent 
almost two years assessing damages, and grammatical evidence of 
forgery might be overlooked in translation of documents to a second 
language.130 In Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Co.,131 the Central 
District of California failed to stay an ATS suit for deaths allegedly 
caused by Colombian military bombing performed to protect oil 
production facilities and pipelines because the foreign action would 
not resolve the U.S. suit.132  
D.   U.S. Courts Have Not Previously Required Exhaustion in an 
ATS Case  
The exhaustion doctrine governs the timing of federal-court 
jurisdiction, similar to abstention and ripeness.133 U.S. administrative 
law often requires exhaustion of internal administrative remedies 
before plaintiffs seek judicial relief in courts.134 The exhaustion 
doctrine is a common principle in international law135 and requires a 
foreign plaintiff to first exhaust any remedies available in the foreign 
domestic legal system.136 U.S. courts have not previously imposed an 
 
 129. Id. at 474–75. 
 130. Id. at 475. 
 131. 381 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (C.D. Cal. 2005). 
 132. Id. at 1134, 1138, 1158. 
 133. McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992). 
 134. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1136 n.104 (C.D. Cal. 
2002); Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 326–27 (1988); Myers v. Bethlehem 
Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50–51 (1938); cf. S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 9 
(1991). 
 135. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004); Banco Nacional 
de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 422–23 (1964); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 703 cmt. d & reporters’ note 6, 713 & cmts. b, f & 
reporters’ note  5, 902 cmt. k (1987). 
 136. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733 n.21; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 
LAW § 713 cmt. f (1987) (“Under international law, ordinarily a state is not 
required to consider a claim by another state for an injury to its national until that 
person has exhausted domestic remedies, unless such remedies are clearly sham or 
inadequate, or their application is unreasonably prolonged.”). But see note 216 and 
accompanying text. 
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exhaustion requirement in an ATS case.137 Some U.S. courts have 
skirted the issue by finding exceptions to the doctrine.138 In a 
footnote, the U.S. Supreme Court said they would “consider this 
requirement in an appropriate case.”139 
IV. THE EN BANC NINTH CIRCUIT COURT’S REASONING  
In Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC,140 a plurality of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that a three-step 
prudential exhaustion analysis is required for cases arising under the 
Alien Tort Statute and remanded the case to the district court to 
perform that analysis.141 The first step is a threshold step.142 If a court 
determines that the “nexus” to the United States is weak, then the 
court should proceed to the next steps, especially if the claims do not 
involve matters of “universal concern” such as those offenses “‘for 
which a state has jurisdiction to punish without regard to the 
territoriality or the nationality of the offenders.’”143 In the second 
step, the court must determine if the plaintiffs had exhausted all of 
their local remedies, which involves “obtain[ing] a final decision of 
the highest court in the hierarchy of courts in the legal system at 
issue[.]”144 The third step provides an exception to exhaustion when 
the local remedies are “ineffective, unobtainable, unduly prolonged, 
 
 137. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 550 F.3d 822, 841 (9th Cir. 2008) (Reinhardt, J., 
dissenting); Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 890 & n.8 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(Cudahy, J., dissenting in part); e.g., Jama v. INS, 22 F. Supp. 2d 353, 364 (D.N.J. 
1998); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 241–44 (2d Cir. 1995), reh’g denied, 74 
F.3d 377, 378 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996); Bowoto v. 
Chevron Corp., 557 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1096 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (“[T]he Ninth Circuit 
has previously upheld justiciability of ATS claims without requiring exhaustion . . . 
.”). 
 138. E.g., Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 
2d 289, 343 n.44 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Bowoto, 557 F. Supp. 2d at 1096–97; In re XE 
Servs. Alien Tort Litig., 665 F. Supp. 2d 569, 595 (E.D. Va. 2009). 
 139. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733 n.21. 
 140. 550 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
 141. Id. at 824–25, 827, 832. The defendant bears the burden to plead and justify 
an exhaustion requirement; the plaintiffs can rebut with evidence necessitating 
exclusion under the third step, but the defendant bears the ultimate burden of 
persuasion. Id. at 832. 
 142. Id. at 824; id. at 833 n.1 (Bea, J., concurring).   
 143. Id. at 824 (plurality opinion) (citation omitted).   
 144. Id. at 831–32; id. at 833 n.1 (Bea, J., concurring).  
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inadequate, or obviously futile” and is a decisive factor itself.145  The 
plurality provided factors for the third step: (1) circumstances 
surrounding the access to a remedy, (2) the ultimate utility of the 
remedy to the petitioner, (3) a favorable judicial decision has not 
been complied with, and (4) assessment of any delay in the delivery 
of a decision.146  
The plurality noted that a prudential principle of exhaustion 
renders unnecessary the analyses of whether or not the TVPA’s 
exhaustion requirement infers congressional intent for a similar 
requirement in the ATS and the substantive or procedural nature of 
the ATS.147 The plurality stated that ATS cases present U.S. courts 
with two divergent impulses foundational to our adjudication of 
international affairs: (1) to respect the principle of comity, and (2) to 
uphold customary international law and adjudicate grave violations of 
international law.148 The “nexus” inquiry allows courts to satisfy the 
international comity impulse. Yet, if only a weak nexus exists, then 
the second impulse may not be satisfied because under the plurality’s 
test, a weak nexus may be more significant than grave violations of 
international law or other horrendous acts. The plurality concluded 
that prudential exhaustion reconciles the competing concerns of 
Judge Bea who posited the Sosa Court contemplated mandatory 
exhaustion and Judge Reinhardt who argued the Sosa Court did not 
suggest exhaustion.149   
Judge Bea wrote a concurrence because he disagreed that the 
exhaustion analysis should include the first step based on the text of 
the ATS.150 Bea also concluded the exhaustion requirement was 
statutorily-derived because he did not think trial courts should have 
discretion to consider the “nexus” or international comity involved, 
interfere with “ongoing international disputes,” and discourage 
“diplomatic, rather than judicial, solutions.”151   
 
 145. See id. at 832; id. at 833 n.1 (Bea, J., concurring).  
 146. Id. at 832 (plurality opinion).   
 147. Id. at 827–28.  
 148. See id. at 830–31.  
 149. Id. at 827 n.3. 
 150. Id. at 833 & n.1, 834 n.3 (Bea, J., concurring). 
 151. Id. at 834 n.3, 835, 837. 
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Judge Ikuta dissented because she would have affirmed the 
case’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on other 
grounds and because a court need not consider exhaustion first.152 
Based on language in Sosa of deference to the political branches, the 
historical context, and prior applications of the ATS, Ikuta concluded 
that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the court 
exceeded the constitutional separation of powers and congressional 
authority to apply the ATS to a dispute not involving U.S. citizens or 
territory.153  
Although Judge Kleinfeld joined in Ikuta’s dissent in full, he 
concurred so the court could provide a “clear direction to the district 
court.”154 Kleinfeld articulated that the exhaustion issue “arises only 
because the Alien Tort Statute has been stretched far beyond its 
purpose.”155  Kleinfeld implied that the ATS’s purpose was to allow 
jurisdiction for violations of the “law of nations” as confined to those 
three types of offenses recognized by the enacting Congress.156 He 
cited Blackstone for the idea that the purpose of the law of nations is 
to maintain “the peace of the world” and concluded that judicial 
discretion in interpreting the “law of nations” has undermined that 
purpose.157  
Because he would not impose an exhaustion requirement, Judge 
Reinhardt dissented based on his conclusions that the U.S. Supreme 
Court did not suggest the adoption of an exhaustion requirement, the 
case is not an “appropriate case” to consider such a requirement, and 
Congress did not explicitly include such a requirement in the ATS.158 
It was not an “appropriate case” because of the long war, plaintiffs’ 
families would be in danger in PNG, plaintiffs might be unable to 
find counsel and compel production of critical witnesses and 
documents in PNG, and no domestic or international law requires 
 
 152. Id. at 837 (Ikuta, J., dissenting).  
 153. Id. at 838–40. 
 154. Id. at 840 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring). 
 155. Id.  
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 841 & n.3. 
 158. Id. at 841 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).  
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plaintiffs alleging serious human rights violations to exhaust local 
remedies when they would risk their lives.159  
Even if this was an “appropriate case,” Reinhardt contended that 
courts should not apply an exhaustion analysis in ATS cases because 
international law and domestic courts enforcing international human 
rights norms do not always require exhaustion.160 He explained that 
the exhaustion of local remedies prerequisite developed to protect 
state sovereignty at a period when international law recognized only 
the rights of states to protect their own citizens and not the 
subsequent interest of states in guaranteeing universal fundamental 
human rights.161 Reinhardt observed that exhaustion under 
international law governs the vertical relationship of international 
tribunals to domestic courts in contrast to the horizontal relationship 
of domestic courts at issue in litigating ATS claims.162 He noted that 
most courts of other nations have not imposed an exhaustion 
requirement before exercising universal jurisdiction and that the 
United States has always resolved competing jurisdiction issues with 
foreign courts through the forum non conveniens doctrine.163 
Reinhardt concluded that prudential considerations do not favor 
imposing an exhaustion requirement because of the policy reasons 
the plurality advanced and because the United States has an interest 
in punishing the heinous violations that the ATS applies to and the 
other justiciability doctrines adequately handle sovereignty and 
comity concerns, which are less pressing when the defendant is a 
corporation.164 Reinhardt distinguished the TVPA’s exhaustion 
requirement from the ATS’s lack of one because only in the former 
must the defendant always have acted with state authority.165  
On remand, the district court concluded that it must impose the 
prudential exhaustion requirement on the ATS environmental claims 
because of the weak nexus between the claims and the United States 
 
 159. Id. at 841–43, 842 n.2. 
 160. Id. at 843–44. 
 161. Id. at 843. 
 162. Id. at 844. 
 163. Id. 
 164. See id. at 845.  
 165. Id. at 845 & n.5. 
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and the lack of “universal” norms for those claims.166 If the plaintiffs 
faced “grave harm” in bringing the suit in PNG, then the exhaustion 
requirement likely will not preclude the ATS UNCLOS claim in this 
case.167 Thus, the court did consider both the international comity 
consideration and the concern for grave violations of international 
law when applying the test, but the weak nexus prevented immediate 
adjudication of these allegedly serious injuries in U.S. courts.   
V.     ANALYSIS  
U.S. courts should not require exhaustion for ATS 
environmental claims because only the most universally condemned 
acts can proceed under the act;168 five other justiciability doctrines 
adequately account for separation of powers, sovereignty, and foreign 
relations concerns;169 and exhaustion is contrary to the legislative 
intent and underlying policies of the ATS.170 The international 
abstention doctrine would better protect judicial resources and 
parties’ and states’ interests.171 If U.S. courts do require exhaustion, 
they should explicitly consider the gravity of the alleged tortious acts, 
stay U.S. suits, and apply equitable tolling to ensure judicial relief.172 
A.  Many Environmental Claims Will Lack Subject Matter 
Jurisdiction Because They Do Not Involve a Violation of a 
Treaty or the Law of Nations  
The exhaustion doctrine is not needed because plaintiffs can only 
establish subject matter jurisdiction for articulable and discernible 
standards that are of a norm comparable to offenses against 
ambassadors, violation of safe conducts, and piracy.  
 
 166. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 650 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1026, 1031–32 (C.D. Cal. 
2009). If the plaintiffs faced “grave harm” in bringing the suit in PNG, then the 
exhaustion requirement likely will not preclude the ATS UNCLOS claim in this 
case. See 550 F.3d at 842; e.g., Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 892 (7th Cir. 
2005) (Cudahy, J., dissenting in part). 
 167. See 550 F.3d at 842; e.g., Enahoro, 408 F.3d at 892. 
 168. See infra Part V.A. 
 169. See infra Part V.B. 
 170. See infra Part V.C. 
 171. See infra Part V.D. 
 172. See infra Part V.D. 
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Although many international environmental agreements are not 
sufficiently specific, some may meet that standard. For example, 
Amlon, Flores, and Sarei suggest that violations of the Rio and 
Stockholm Declarations do not constitute violations of the law of 
nations, however, some of their principles might be sufficiently 
specific and universal to constitute the law of nations. The 
sustainable development, inter-generational equity, freedom from 
oppression, prevention of marine pollution, and transboundary 
pollution principles contain actual mandates to protect the 
environment or declare that humans have a “fundamental right” to a 
quality environment.173 Despite these provisions’ clear goals, a court 
might find them “devoid of articulable or discernible standards” like 
the Beanal court found for the polluter pays, precautionary, and 
proximity principles or not sufficient to meet the Sosa test. 
Courts may find six subsequent international agreements 
comprise the law of nations as they are more specific and reinforce 
the universality of the Rio and Stockholm Declarations’ norms and 
meet the Sosa standard. Agenda 21, by itself, appears to lie on the 
line separating the law of nations from other agreements because it 
was only adopted by 178 nations, but similar to UNCLOS requires 
states to cooperate in establishing legal frameworks and liability to 
prevent deforestation and marine pollution through broad mining 
changes.174 The Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable 
Development reaffirms Agenda 21 and declares that companies have 
a “duty” of sustainable development and that the world needs actions 
 
 173. See United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 
Swed., June 5–16, 1972, Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the 
Human Environment, princs. 1, 2, 5, 7, A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 [hereinafter 
Stockholm Declaration], available at http://www.un-documents.net/unchedec.htm; 
Rio Declaration, supra note 63, princs. 3, 8, 13, 14, 23.   
 174. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de 
Janeiro, Braz., June 3–14, 1992, Earth Summit, Agenda 21: The U.N. Programme 
of Action from Rio, chs. 11, 17, 18, 30, 39.1–39.2, 39.10, U.N. Doc. 
A.CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Aug. 12, 1992), available at http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/ 
agenda21/res_agenda21_00.shtml; U.N. DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFF., DIVISION 
FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., AGENDA 21, http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/agenda21/ (last 
visited Apr. 18, 2011) (recommending that States employ the precautionary 
principle, polluter pays principle, and environmental assessments). 
CHERYL 11/30/2011  6:18 PM 
2011] SAREI V. RIO TINTO 217 
 
at all levels to foster sustainable mining practices.175 Although 
sustainable mining and sustainable development can prevent grave 
environmental damage, courts may find they do not reach the Sosa 
level. As the Sarei district court and Ninth Circuit panel determined, 
UNCLOS may comprise the law of nations.176 
More similar to the specific demands and presence of specific 
liability provisions of UNCLOS, the Convention on the Protection 
and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes177 
and the Danube Convention178 require all signatory States to prevent 
and reduce any transboundary impacts.179 The Protocol on Civil 
Liability is the civil liability instrument for the Water Convention and 
holds operators strictly liable.180 Interestingly, exhaustion is not 
required as claims for violations of either convention can be brought 
in courts where the damage occurred, the industrial accident 
occurred, or at the location of defendant’s residence or principle 
 
 175. U.N. World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg, S. Afr., 
Aug. 26–Sept. 4, 2002, Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, 
¶¶ 15(b), 25(d)-(e), 26(a), 27, 46, 58, 139, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.199/20 [hereinafter 
Johannesburg Declaration]. 
 176. See UNCLOS, supra note 29, arts. 2, 3, 139, 193, 194, 207, 213, 235, 1833 
U.N.T.S. at 400, 447, 478, 481, 485, 494. But see Mank, supra note 61, at 1088. As 
a signatory, the United States is obligated to refrain from acts that would defeat the 
purpose or object of UNCLOS. Vienna Convention, supra note 59, art. 18, 1155 
U.N.T.S. at 336. 
 177. Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and 
International Lakes, Mar. 17, 1992, 1936 U.N.T.S. 269 [hereinafter Water 
Convention] (entered into force Oct. 16, 1996), available at http://treaties.un.org/ 
doc/Treaties/1992/03/19920317%2005-46%20AM/Ch_XXVII_05p.pdf.   
 178. Convention on Cooperation for the Protection and Sustainable Use of the 
Danube River, 1997 O.J. (L 342) 40 (EC) [hereinafter Danube Convention].   
 179. Id. arts. 2, 5; Water Convention, supra note 177, art. 2. Both the Water 
Convention and Danube Convention incorporate the precautionary, polluter pays, 
inter-generational, and sustainable development principles. Water Convention, 
supra note 177, art. 2; Danube Convention, supra note 178, art. 2.   
 180. Protocol on Civil Liability and Compensation for Damage Caused by the 
Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents on Transboundary Waters to the 
1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and 
International Lakes and to the 1992 Convention on the Transboundary Effects of 
Industrial Accidents, May 21, 2003, U.N. Doc. ECE/MP.WAT/7/ECE/CP.TEIA/5 
[hereinafter Protocol on Civil Liability], available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/ 
Treaties/2003/05/20030521%2002-09%20PM/Ch_XXVII_16p.pdf. 
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place of business181 and disputes pursuant to both Conventions and 
Protocol may be settled by negotiation, the I.C.J., arbitration, or other 
means suitable to the disputing parties.182 As the transboundary water 
pollution that these conventions address has impacts as severe as 
piracy, these conventions should meet the Sosa standard.  
Articles 5, 8, and 14 of the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD) may comprise the law of nations as they require specific 
actions similar to UNCLOS. They require States to (1) conduct 
environmental impact assessments of projects that are likely to have 
significant adverse impacts on biological diversity, (2) cooperate with 
other parties for the “conservation and sustainable use of biological 
diversity,” (3) “[p]romote environmentally sound and sustainable 
development in areas adjacent to protected areas,” (4) “restore 
degraded ecosystems,” and (5) “develop or maintain necessary 
legislation and/or other regulatory provisions for the protection of 
threatened species.”183 The CBD may meet the Sosa standard as it has 
193 parties and 168 signatories, including the signatory United 
States.184 The preamble to the CBD, which states “the conservation 
and sustainable use of biological diversity will strengthen friendly 
relations among States and contribute to peace for humankind[,]”185 
and the Johannesburg Declaration’s reaffirmation of the CBD 
confirms that the CBD should satisfy the Sosa standard.186 
In addition, ATS environmental claims binding the 
environmental harm with human rights violations may comprise the 
law of nations.187 Yet, if acts did not violate U.S. law, international 
 
 181. Id. art. 13.  
 182. Water Convention, supra note 177, art. 22; Danube Convention, supra note 
178, art. 24; Protocol on Civil Liability, supra note 180, art. 26. 
 183. See Convention on Biological Diversity arts. 5, 8, 14, June 5, 1992, 1760 
U.N.T.S. 79, 147, 148–49, 151–52 [hereinafter CBD], available at 
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1992/06/19920605%2008-44%20PM/Ch_ XXV 
II_08p.pdf. 
 184. United Nations, Convention on Biological Diversity, U.N. TREATY 
COLLECTION., (Apr. 18, 2011), http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src= 
TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-8&chapter=27&lang=en.  
 185. CBD, supra note 183, pmbl. 
 186. Johannesburg Declaration, supra note 175, ¶¶ 32, 44. 
 187. See Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. v. Wiwa, 626 F. Supp. 2d 377, 384–85 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (ATS cause of action against oil company for military’s heinous 
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consensus may not be capable of providing the basis for an ATS 
claim.188 Therefore, until Congress enacts a statute similar to the 
TVPA to expressly provide recovery of damages for environmental 
harm by U.S. multinational corporations, the limited universe of the 
“law of nations” will limit environmental suits to those with 
significant universally-accepted norms. 
B.  An Exhaustion Doctrine Is Redundant Because Many Courts 
Have Dismissed Environmental ATS Claims Under Other 
Doctrines 
Because the forum non conveniens, political question, act of 
state, international comity, and international abstention doctrines 
adequately address the separation of powers, sovereignty, foreign 
relations, and comity concerns that Judge Bybee and the en banc 
court raised, the Ninth Circuit should not have established an 
exhaustion doctrine for the ATS.  
The political question and international comity doctrines 
adequately allocate the judicial, executive, and legislative branch 
authority. Under the political question doctrine, courts can interpret 
international treaties and executive agreements, but do dismiss cases 
if executive branch agreements and compensation systems exist or 
are foreseeable to avoid infringing on the Executive Branch. Thus, 
the political question doctrine likely will address cases characterized 
by torts sufficiently egregious to invoke Executive Branch action. 
The international comity doctrine covers the remaining torts that are 
of such a character to be actionable under the law of nations but that 
the Executive Branch has not addressed. It allows courts to actually 
assess each State’s legislative and executive interests and 
expectations so the exhaustion analysis is redundant.   
 
acts); Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 557 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1091–95 (N.D. Cal. 2008) 
(similar); Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 187 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding ATS 
cause of action sufficient because of non-consensual medical experimentation on 
humans); Randall S. Abate, Climate Change, the United States, and the Impacts of 
Arctic Melting: A Case Study in the Need for Enforceable International 
Environmental Human Rights, 26A STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 3, 20–25 (2007). But see 
Flores v. S. Peru Copper Co, 343 F.3d 140, 161–65 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 188. Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (context of combatant 
acts).   
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All five of these other doctrines consider the gamut of 
sovereignty, foreign relations, and comity concerns. The forum non 
conveniens and international abstention doctrines’ considerations of 
comity in terms of cost, time, piecemeal litigation, and availability of 
witnesses and evidence on juror and court burdens negate the 
necessity of having an exhaustion doctrine to defer to local 
adjudication. By deferring to definitive Executive Branch policy 
decisions, the political question doctrine more narrowly (and 
appropriately) considers sovereignty and foreign relations concerns. 
The act of state and international comity doctrines’ factors of 
determining if a perpetrating government still exists, the validity of 
the acts, and the interests of each State and the international 
abstention’s deference to judicial proceedings pending at an advanced 
stage, adequately and more aptly address concerns for each State’s 
sovereignty and foreign relations. 
C.  The ATS Does Not Require Exhaustion and the Court Should 
Not Prudentially Impose a New Requirement 
Courts should not impose statutorily-derived or judicially-
created exhaustion because exhaustion contradicts the ATS’s text, 
history, legislative intent,189 and underlying policies.190   
1.   An Exhaustion Requirement Is Contrary to the ATS’s 
Text and Legislative Intent and the Supreme Court’s 
Resolution of a Related Statute 
The establishment of an exhaustion requirement is contrary to 
the text, history, and legislative history of the ATS. The starting point 
of interpretation of a statute is its text.191 Further, because no record 
exists of any congressional debate of the ATS, commentators have 
focused on the text in interpreting its breadth.192 The first Congress 
enacted the Alien Tort Statute as part of Section 9 of the Judiciary 
 
 189. See infra Part V.C.1. 
 190. See infra Part V.C.2. 
 191. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC 
POLICY 849 (4th ed. 2007). 
 192. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 713, 718 (2004); Trajano v. Marcos (In 
re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litig.), 978 F.2d 493, 498 (9th Cir. 
1992). 
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Act of 1789.193 The Judiciary Act is a statute exclusively concerned 
with federal court jurisdiction.194 The original statute stated “[t]hat 
the district courts shall have . . . (b) . . . cognizance, concurrent with 
the courts of the several States, or the circuit courts, as the case may 
be, of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the 
law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”195 The text clearly 
does not impose an exhaustion requirement. Congress used the 
mandatory language “shall” rather than “may” and provided explicit 
exceptions for non-torts and torts that do not violate a treaty or the 
law of nations; the expressio unius and mandatory canons indicate the 
courts must exercise jurisdiction for these claims.196 The fact that 
Congress gave district courts concurrent jurisdiction with other courts 
over alien tort claims without mentioning exhaustion for any of the 
courts suggests no such requirement existed.197 Because “[o]nly 
statutory exhaustion requirements containing ‘sweeping and direct’ 
language deprive a federal court of jurisdiction,”198 U.S. courts 
should not impose a jurisdictional exhaustion requirement.  
Employing the presumption of meaningful variation, the express 
inclusion of an exhaustion requirement in a treaty and three related 
jurisdictional statutes indicates that Congress did not intend an 
exhaustion requirement in the ATS.199 As the Ninth Circuit briefly 
discusses, Congress explicitly required exhaustion in the Jay Treaty, 
which covers similar issues and was enacted within a few years of the 
 
 193. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789). 
 194. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 713. 
 195. 1 Stat. at 76, 77 (emphasis added). The word “cognizance” described here is 
equivalent to jurisdiction.  See id. In Section 9(c), Congress also gave the courts 
“cognizance” over specific suits and then stated they “shall also have jurisdiction” 
for other specific suits. Id. Also persuasive in concluding the Judiciary Act did not 
require exhaustion is the fact that exactly next to the ATS in section 9(b) is the note 
“Concurrent jurisdiction.” See id. 
 196. See ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 191, at 854–56, 859–60. 
 197. See supra note 195 and accompanying text. 
 198. Ace Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Fed. Crop Ins. Corp., 440 F.3d 992, 999 (8th 
Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).  
 199. See ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 191, at 855–56, 866–67 
(citing Chan v. Korean Air Lines, 490 U.S. 122 (1989)). 
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Alien Tort Statute.200 Congress added an explicit exhaustion 
requirement to the TVPA, which is contained in the ATS’s historical 
notes, but not in the ATS’s text.201 An exhaustion requirement in the 
TVPA does not positively inform a similar requirement for the ATS 
because although they are co-extensive,202 the TVPA’s text and 
location suggests it was meant to expand, not restrict, remedies 
available under the ATS, as the House and Senate Committee 
Reports state.203 The main purposes of the TVPA—to strike a balance 
between providing redress, burdening U.S. courts when foreign 
courts where alleged torture or killing occurred can more 
appropriately handle cases, and encouraging meaningful remedies in 
other countries204—are not as applicable for ATS suits because the 
desire to encourage remedies in other countries is not as great for acts 
less severe than torture and killing. Also, courts should give effect to 
both acts because repeal of legislative text by implication is 
 
 200. See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1215 (9th Cir. 2007); Treaty of 
Amity, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Gr. Brit., arts. VI, VII, Nov. 19, 1794, 8 
Stat. 116 [hereinafter Jay Treaty].  
 201. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 2(b), 106 
Stat. 73, 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006)).   
 202. Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 888–89 (7th Cir. 2005) (Cudahy, J., 
dissenting in part) (citing Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 153 (2d 
Cir. 2003); Beanal v. Freeport McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 168–69 (5th Cir. 
1999); discussing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 728–29 (2004)). But see 
Enahoro, 408 F.3d at 884–85 (majority opinion). 
 203. Enahoro, 408 F.3d at 886–89 & n.2 (Cudahy, J., dissenting in part). The 
TVPA created liability for acts of torture and extrajudicial killing, whereas the ATS 
only refers to jurisdiction. Id. at 887 & n.3.  
Section 1350 has other important uses and should not be replaced. There 
should also, however, be a clear and specific remedy, not limited to aliens, 
for torture and extrajudicial killing. . . . That statute should remain intact 
to permit suits based on other norms that already exist or may ripen in the 
future into rules of customary international law.  
H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, pt. 1, at 3–4 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 
86. “Section 1350 has other important uses and should not be replaced.” S. REP. 
NO. 102-249, at 4 (1991). Both reports also mention the reason for enacting the 
TVPA was to expressly provide a remedy to victims of torture because a D.C. 
Circuit judge questioned the existence of an implicit right of action under the ATS. 
H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, pt. 1, at 4, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86; S. REP. 
NO. 102-249, at 4–5. 
 204. H.R. REP.  NO. 102-367, pt. 1, at 3–5, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 
85–88; S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 3–5; Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 241 (2d Cir. 
1995).  
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disfavored absent clearly expressed congressional intent.205 The 
evolution of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976206 
demonstrates that Congress can expressly provide an exhaustion-like 
requirement for a statute when it intends one for certain actions, 
amend the text to exclude certain suits, and except certain countries 
when the foreign policy implications of U.S. jurisdiction are too 
great.207 
Finally, analysis of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 can shed light because of 
its close connection with the ATS and TVPA.208 The Supreme Court 
held that plaintiffs need not exhaust state administrative remedies 
before filing suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on the legislative 
history of § 1983 and its predecessor, Section 1 of the Civil Rights 
 
 205. Enahoro, 408 F.3d at 887 (citing Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 273 
(2003); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974)).   
 206. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2006), amended by 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (Supp. II 2008). 
 207. Id. (originally enacted as Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 94 Pub. L. No. 
583, 90 Stat. 289, amended by Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. 
L. No. 104-132, § 221, 110 Stat. 1214, 1241, 1243 (1996) (emphasis added)) 
(amended in 1996 by adding the exhaustion requirement of subsection (a)(7) to § 
1605); Act of Apr. 25, 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-11, 111 Stat. 22 (retroactively 
amended the new subsection to clarify that a U.S. suit could not be maintained if 
neither the claimant nor the victim was a U.S. national); National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 1083, 122 Stat. 3, 
338–41 (2008) (codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1605A) (changing § 1605(a)(7) to section 
1605A); H.R. DOC. NO. 110-88, at 5 (2008) (Presidential Veto Statement); 154 
CONG. REC. H76–260 (daily ed. Jan. 16, 2008); 154 CONG. REC. S55–57 (daily ed. 
Jan. 22, 2008) (explaining that Congress gave the President authority to waive 
Iraq’s liability and the President signed the amended National Defense 
Authorization Act of 2008 into law). But in Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, the 
Ninth Circuit determined that 1605(a)(7) only required arbitration, not exhaustion 
of local remedies. 616 F.3d 1019, 1034, 1037 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
 208. H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, pt. 1, at 5, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 87; 
S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 8; Papa v. United States, 281 F.3d 1004, 1012 (9th Cir. 
2002) (noting that before the passage of the TVPA, U.S. courts had held that the 
closest federal analogy to the ATS was 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Beanal v. Freeport-
McMoran, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 374–77 (E.D. La. 1997); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 207 (1987). The TVPA House and Senate Reports 
state that U.S. courts should look to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to construe the TVPA’s 
“color of law” requirement. H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, pt. 1, at 5, reprinted in 1992 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 87; S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 8. According to § 1983’s legislative 
history, § 1983’s reasons are similar to the ATS’s, i.e., protection of fundamental 
individual rights that other courts might have inadequate factfinding or be unable or 
unwilling to protect and for which Congress provided concurrent jurisdiction. See 
Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 501–16 (1982). 
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Act of 1871.209 The Court evaluated the text and legislative history of 
42 U.S.C. § 1997, recently passed for institutionalized persons with 
an express exhaustion requirement, to conclude that an ad hoc, 
judicially-imposed exhaustion requirement in other § 1983 suits 
would be inconsistent with Congress’s “decision to adopt a detailed 
exhaustion scheme in 42 U.S.C. § 1997 and would usurp policy 
judgments.”210 
Similar to the Court’s conclusion regarding a § 1983 exhaustion 
requirement, the rules against absurdity and redundancy also suggest 
that Congress did not implicitly include an exhaustion requirement in 
the ATS.211 Congress would not have enacted a redundant provision 
in the TVPA if the ATS contained one.212  Because the ATS is only 
applicable to universally condemned acts, imposing an exhaustion 
requirement when judicial protection will likely be ineffective leads 
to an absurd result,213 which Congress likely did not intend. As Judge 
Ikuta suggested, Congress intended for U.S. courts to hear ATS 
claims because the young nation wanted other nations to interact with 
it without fearing a lack of judicial recourse in its courts.214 The 
Supreme Court concluded that Congress intended the immediate 
practical use of the ATS cause of action for the benefit of 
foreigners.215 Imposing an exhaustion requirement would negate such 
 
 209. Patsy, 457 U.S. at 501–16. 
 210. Id. at 507–10, 512. 
 211. See id. at 507–12;infra note 219; ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra 
note 191, at 860–61, 865. 
 212. See infra notes 219, 239 and accompanying text; ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & 
GARRETT, supra note 191, at 865. 
 213. See S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 3–4. The TVPA Senate Report notes that  
While nearly every nation now condemns torture and extrajudicial killing 
in principle, in practice more than one-third of the world’s governments 
engage in, tolerate, or condone such acts [and] . . . [j]udicial protection 
against flagrant . . . violations is often least effective in those countries 
where such abuses are most prevalent . . . . Consequently, the . . . TVPA is 
designed to respond to this situation by providing a civil cause of action in 
U.S. courts for torture committed abroad. 
 Id. 
 214. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 550 F.3d 822, 838–39 (9th Cir. 2008) (Ikuta, J., 
dissenting); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S 692, 716–17 (2004) (citations 
omitted). 
 215. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 719, 724. 
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an immediate effect. This analysis extends to torts not committed by 
U.S. citizens in U.S. territory because the ATS covers crimes 
committed on the high seas as piracy.216 
Congressional inaction also indicates the lack of an exhaustion 
requirement. Even though Congress had added an exhaustion 
requirement to a treaty in 1794, it never added an explicit exhaustion 
requirement into the ATS, even when it did alter some of the statute’s 
text on three separate occasions.217 This congressional inaction is 
persuasive because it occurred over a period of 200 years (the statute 
laid dormant over most of this period, but its language and 
punctuation was amended three times in this period), and even 
occurred subsequent to an increase in ATS suits after 1980218 and 
after 1992 when Congress explicitly added an exhaustion requirement 
to the TVPA.219 
 
 216. See id. at 719. But see Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 625 F.3d 561, 563–64 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). 
 217. See infra note 219. Congress slightly modified the ATS in 1878 with the 
first codification of federal law. JENNIFER, K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RL32118, THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND EXECUTIVE 
BRANCH VIEWS 5 (2003). Among other minor changes, the word “cognizance” was 
changed to “jurisdiction” and the word “only” was placed in quotation marks. See 
id. (“The district courts shall have jurisdiction . . . [o]f all suits brought by any alien 
for a tort ‘only’ in violation of the law of nations, or of a treaty of the United 
States.”). In 1911, Congress modified its punctuation when the laws of the Judicial 
Code were codified, revised, and amended. All Writs Act, ch. 231, Pub. L. No. 61-
475, § 24, 36 Stat. 1087, 1091, 1093 (1911) (“The district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction as follows: . . . Of all suits brought by any alien for a tort only, in 
violation of the laws of nations or of a treaty of the United States.”). Finally, in 
1948, Congress added the word “committed” to the statute when the judiciary code 
was revised, codified, and enacted into law as title 28 of the United States Code. 
Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Rules of Decisions Act, ch. 646, Pub. L. No. 80-
773, § 1350, 62 Stat. 869, 934 (1948) (“The district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of 
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”).  
 218. Cf. ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 191, at 1036–40 (citing 
Montana Wilderness Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 655 F.2d 951, cert. denied, 455 
U.S. 989 (9th Cir. 1981)).   
 219. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 2, 106 Stat. 
73, 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2006)). Section 2(b) of the TVPA 
is titled “Exhaustion of Remedies” and states “[a] court shall decline to hear a claim 
under this section if the claimant has not exhausted adequate and available 
remedies in the place in which the conduct giving rise to the claim occurred.” Id. 
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As the Supreme Court has explained, congressional intent is of 
“paramount importance” to any exhaustion inquiry,220 and legislative 
history, especially from committee reports, often provides a good 
record of congressional intent.221 Although legislative history does 
not exist for the ATS,222 the TVPA’s legislative history suggests a 
lack of exhaustion for the ATS. Although the House223 and Senate224 
Committee Reports describe in detail the TVPA’s exhaustion 
requirement, neither report expressly mentions a similar requirement 
for the ATS. In the floor debate prior to House passage, Rep. 
Mazzoli, the floor manager, stated that a bipartisan amendment added 
to the bill in committee with the Subcommittee on International Law 
ranking member, kept the TVPA’s exhaustion requirement, but 
removed text that required the defendant to prove by “clear and 
convincing evidence” that the claimant had not exhausted local 
 
 220. McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992). 
 221. ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 191, at 981. 
 222. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 718 (2004). 
 223. H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, pt. 1, at 4–5 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
84, 86–88. The House describes the reasons as “[s]triking a balance between the 
desirability of providing redress for a victim and the fear of imposing additional 
burdens on U.S. courts,” “ensur[ing] that U.S. courts will not intrude into cases 
more appropriately handled by courts where the alleged torture or killing occurred, 
. . . avoid[ing] exposing U.S. courts to unnecessary burdens, and . . . encourag[ing] 
the development of meaningful remedies in other countries.” Id.   
 224. S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 9–10 (1991).  
A court may decline to exercise the TVPA’s grant of jurisdiction only if it 
appears that adequate and available remedies can be assured where the 
conduct complained of occurred, and that the plaintiff has not exhausted 
local remedies there. Cases involving torture abroad which have been filed 
under the Alien Tort Claims Act show that torture victims bring suits in 
the United States against their alleged torturers only as a last resort. 
Usually, the alleged torturer has more substantial assets outside the United 
States and the jurisdictional nexus is easier to prove outside the United 
States. Therefore, as a general matter, the committee recognizes that in 
most instances the initiation of litigation under this legislation will be 
virtually prima facie evidence that the claimant has exhausted his or her 
remedies in the jurisdiction in which the torture occurred. The committee 
believes that courts should approach cases brought under the proposed 
legislation with this assumption . . . courts in the United States are 
equipped to deal with the intricacies of determining issues of foreign law 
and will have to undertake a case-by-case approach. 
Id. 
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remedies.225 This suggests Congress carefully considered the 
specifics of the exhaustion requirement that would go into the 
historical notes of the ATS. Even the minority views in the Senate 
Committee Report do not mention that the ATS has an exhaustion 
requirement.226  
Two other topics that Congress broached affirm this 
interpretation of the legislative history. The Senate Report 
specifically states that “the explicit reference in this legislation to 
principles of equitable tolling is in no way intended to suggest that 
such principles do not apply in other statutes . . . which do not 
explicitly contain equitable tolling clauses,” but it makes no similar 
pronouncement for exhaustion,227 and Congress likely did not think 
the ATS required exhaustion because of courts’ previous lack of 
requiring it.228 Also, the affirmation of universal jurisdiction indicates 
that Congress did not intend to require an exhaustion requirement in 
all circumstances.229 Thus, similar to Darby v. Cisneros,230 where the 
Court held that merely optional intra-agency appeals not mandated by 
statute or agency rule need not be exhausted before judicial review 
under the Administrative Procedure Act,231 courts should not require 
exhaustion of merely optional foreign suits. 
2.   Public Policy Advises Against a Prudential Exhaustion 
Requirement  
In addition, courts should not prudentially require exhaustion 
because public policy weighs against requiring exhaustion, and, even 
if public policy favored exhaustion, “policy considerations alone 
cannot justify judicially imposed exhaustion unless exhaustion is 
consistent with congressional intent.”232 The promotion of human 
 
 225. 137 CONG. REC. 34,785 (1991) (statement of Rep. Romano Mazzoli). 
 226. S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 13–15.  
 227. Id. at 11.    
 228. Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 890–91 & nn.8–9 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(Cudahy, J., dissenting in part). 
 229. S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 4–5.    
 230. 509 U.S. 137 (1993). 
 231. Id. at 153–54. 
 232. Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 513 (1982). The policy reasons given 
for desiring to require exhaustion for § 1983 suits include lessening court burdens, 
furthering comity and government relations, and enlightening the Court’s decision 
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rights, discouragement of egregious acts, and guarantee of access to a 
competent and uncorrupt judicial system that enforces judgments 
outweigh the minimal burden of additional lawsuits in U.S. courts, 
especially for egregious acts. 
First, the lack of an exhaustion requirement will not overburden 
U.S. courts with numerous ATS suits. Federal courts already operate 
with an effective jurisdictional scheme wherein defendants must have 
“minimum” contacts with the United States for the U.S. court to 
possess personal jurisdiction.233 The few ATS cases on the dockets 
attest to their minimal burden, and even though they will provide 
additional work “few cases on the dockets of Federal courts will be 
more important than those contemplated by this legislation.”234   
The United States’s interests and foreign relations actually favor 
no exhaustion requirement. Exhaustion may preclude the United 
States’s promotion of human rights throughout the world, prevent 
effective domestic remedies, and allow U.S. safe havens for violators 
of egregious acts, which are against the emphatic statement of the 
Chair of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.235 The presence of 
universal jurisdiction for certain crimes supports the legitimacy of the 
United States invoking jurisdiction.236 Adjudication of acts that 
 
through more expert adjudication. Id. at 512. The Sarei en banc members gave 
similar reasons.  See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 233. S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 7; e.g., Licci v. Am. Express Bank Ltd., 704 F. 
Supp. 2d 403, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 02 
Civ. 7618 (KMW) (HBP), 2010 WL 2507025, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2010) 
(finding shipments of oil to the United States, employees “cross-posted” or who 
otherwise visited the United States, and the recruitment of United States residents 
to work in Nigeria were insufficient contacts). But see Pugh v. Socialist People’s 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 290 F. Supp. 2d 54, 59–60 (D.D.C. 2003) (finding that the 
most important consideration for personal jurisdiction is “whether a defendant’s 
‘conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably 
anticipate being haled into court there.’”). 
 234. 135 CONG. REC. 22,715 (1989) (statement of Rep. Chris Smith).  
 235. Id. at 22,714–15 (statement of Rep. Fascell). This bill was jointly referred to 
this committee, but it gave up bill action without prejudice to expedite the bill’s 
consideration. Id.   
 236. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404 & cmt. a 
(1987). Under universal jurisdiction, a State can apply its laws to punish offenses of 
universal concern as recognized by the community of nations, even if the state has 
no territorial links with the offense or nationality with parties. Id. 
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occurred in foreign states is not likely to adversely affect foreign 
relations more than unilateral “sanctions” prior to exhaustion of local 
remedies, which are currently allowed.237 Further, the imposition of 
an exhaustion requirement can impede justice by providing States the 
ability to delay suits.238 Even when plaintiffs are able to obtain a 
foreign judgment, they may not be able to enforce a judgment in the 
defendant’s home state.239   
International law does not require exhaustion of local remedies 
for domestic suits and even suggests nations not impose one.240 It 
only expressly appears to suggest deferment of international 
tribunals prior to state adjudication.241 As the Ninth Circuit noted, 
 
 237. See id. § 703 cmt. d. “The individual’s failure to exhaust remedies is not an 
obstacle to informal intercession by a state on behalf of an individual, to unilateral 
‘sanctions’ by a state against another for human rights violations, or to multilateral 
measures against violators by United Nations bodies or international financial 
institutions.” Id. Such “‘sanctions’” include criticism or the alteration of “its trade, 
aid or other national policies so as to dissociate itself from the violating state or to 
influence the state to discontinue the violations.” Id. § 703 cmt. f. (emphasis 
added). 
 238. 154 CONG. REC. S55 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 2008) (statement of Sen. Frank 
Lautenberg). Senator Lautenberg, the author of the 2008 FSIA amendment, cited 
examples of foreign states, such as Libya, that have purposely delayed final 
resolution of suits. Id. 
 239. S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 10 (1991) (citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 
166–67 (1895); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 4[8]2 
(1987)). U.S. courts can refuse to recognize foreign judgments when the outcome 
or procedures are unfair or the foreign court lacks competence and that “[c]ourts 
will not recognize or enforce foreign judgments contrary to public policy or 
fundamental notions of decency and justice.” Id. (emphasis added).  A Florida court 
denied recognition of a Nicaraguan judgment against Dole Food Company for the 
lack of “due process of law.” Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 
1351–52 (S.D. Fla. 2009).     
 240. See Alison Lindsay Shinsato, Increasing the Accountability of Transnational 
Corporations for Environmental Harms: The Petroleum Industry in Nigeria, 4 NW. 
U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 186, 204 (2005) (citations omitted). The Restatement (Third) 
section 402 advises that home states should or may impose domestic environmental 
law on foreign branches of its corporations and its nationals or conduct outside its 
territory that has substantial effect within its territory. Id.   
 241. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 713 cmt. f  & 
reporters’ note 5 (1987). The I.C.J. stated “‘[t]he rule that local remedies must be 
exhausted before international proceedings may be instituted is a well-established 
rule of customary international law [and a State should have an opportunity to 
redress the violation within its own domestic legal system] . . . . [b]efore resort may 
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Restatement (Third) section 713, on its face, only applies to claims 
by one State against another where interests of comity are most 
compelling.242 The Ninth Circuit previously determined that 
“[i]nternational law ‘does not require any particular reaction to 
violations of law’” and domestic law can govern the nation’s 
responses to ATS violations.243 Restatement (Third) section 443, 
comment f suggests that United States courts can adjudicate foreign 
suits first.244 Finally, Congress and international tribunals require that 
courts resolve ambiguity on the adequacy of local remedies in favor 
of plaintiffs, suggesting a policy to ensure plaintiffs can obtain 
justice.245   
Parties’ interests in obtaining justice strongly support not adding 
an exhaustion analysis.  Both plaintiffs and defendants may face 
whims, undetected fraud or corruption, or incompetency of parties, 
attorneys, foreign courts, enforcement officials, or discovery 
procedures that might impede justice and the prevention of grave 
environmental harm. For example, Newmont Mining Corporation 
faced three years of lawsuits in Indonesia for the discharge of 5.5 
million tons of gold mine waste and settled a $543 million suit.246 
Newmont settled the government’s civil suit by agreeing to monitor a 
bay for ten years and spend $30 million on community projects.247 
Newmont stated that Indonesia’s legal system was arbitrary and 
 
be had to an international court . . . .’” Id. § 713 reporters’ note 5 (emphasis 
added).   
 242. Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 616 F.3d 1019, 1036 n.26 (9th Cir. 2010) (en 
banc). 
 243. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos (In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights 
Litig.), 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1126 (1995) 
(citations omitted). 
 244. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 443 cmt. f (1987). A 
failure to adjudicate in the United States because of the act of state doctrine “would 
not preclude a challenge to the same act in the courts of the acting state, in the 
courts of a third state, or in an international adjudication . . . .” Id. 
 245. Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 892 (7th Cir. 2005) (Cudahy, J., 
dissenting in part) (citing S. REP. NO. 102-249 (1991)). 
 246. Larmer, supra note 2, at 50; Donald Greenlees, Indonesian Court Acquits 
Newmont Mining, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2007, at A8; Transcript of Verdict, Indon. 
Ministry of Env’t v. PT Newmont Minahasa Raya, 284/Pid.B/2005/PN.MDO, at 
124 (2007) [hereinafter Indonesia Verdict], available at http://www.buyatbayfacts. 
com/pdfs_ docs/VERDICT.pdf.  
 247. Indonesia Verdict, supra note 246, at 437–38; Greenlees, supra note 246. 
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potentially unprepared for a criminal case complicated with 
environmental science.248 After a 21-month criminal trial, the 
Manado District Court acquitted Newmont in 2007 because the 
prosecution did not prove the mine tailings caused environmental 
pollution or health problems.249 Yet, the water and fish samples relied 
on might have been insufficient because the court exhibits only 
mention samples from four fish and forty-nine samples total of water, 
sediment, sludge, or tailings and Newmont collected some, or 
perhaps all, of its samples.250 A peer-reviewed scientific study found 
the tailings likely contaminated the bay with toxic levels of arsenic 
and possibly mercury.251 Also, the Indonesian court might have been 
biased because Newmont said it might reconsider its investments252 
and Indonesia is lax on regulating environmental harm; less than one 
percent of environmental crimes are punished.253   
Even more apparent, in 2009, a California court found that the 
plaintiffs and their U.S. and Nicaraguan counsel committed fraud by 
filing suits against Dole Food Co. that alleged sterility from exposure 
 
 248. Jane Perlez, Pollution Trial of Mining Company to Begin in Indonesia, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 5, 2005, at A3. In response, the Indonesian Supreme Court requested 
that two judges who attended special environmental law courses replace two judges 
on the provincial court. Id. 
 249. Indonesia Verdict, supra note 246, at 456–57, 464, 484–85; Larmer, supra 
note 2, at 51; Greenlees, supra note 246. The Court sided with Newmont because a 
World Health Organization study showed metal exposure did not cause the 
illnesses, police improperly collected the water and fish tissue samples, subsequent 
government, university, and Australian studies did not find metals’ levels that 
exceeded water quality standards, and Newmont had discharged its tailings below 
the thermocline. See Indonesia Verdict, supra note 246, at 204–05, 212–14, 244, 
433–83.    
 250. Indonesia Verdict, supra note 246, at 5–19, 362, 449–52. 
 251. Evan N. Edinger, P. Raja Siregar & George M. Blackwood, Heavy Metal 
Concentrations in Shallow Marine Sediments Affected by Submarine Tailings 
Disposal and Artisanal Gold Mining, Buyat-Ratototok District, North Sulawesi, 
Indonesia, 52 ENVTL. GEOLOGY 701, 709–10 (2007).  
 252. See Indonesian Court Clears U.S. Firm in Pollution Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
24, 2007, at A16. This case illustrates how intranational environmental harm might 
not truly be intranational.  See Stuart G. Gross, Note, Inordinate Chill: Bits, Non-
NAFTA MITS, and Host-State Regulatory Freedom—An Indonesian Case Study, 24 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 893, 903 (2003). Indonesian forests currently are home to 10% of 
the world's flowering plant species, 12% of its mammal species, 17% of its bird 
species, and 16% of its reptile and amphibian species. Id.   
 253. Schmidt, supra note 9, at 221. 
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to a banana farm pesticide because most of the plaintiffs had never 
worked on such farms.254 Dole might have faced millions of dollars 
in court expenses from thousands of suits if a foreign court did not 
detect the fraud or allowed the fraud to continue.255 In such 
circumstances, an exhaustion requirement will not correct parties’ 
errors or allow resolution by a more experienced court and 
compilation of an adequate record.256   
Finally, because of the inhumanity of the torts within ATS 
jurisdiction, equity in providing for remedies and preventing 
egregious acts is more important than providing a similar exhaustion 
scheme among two statutes. Exhaustion might bring consistency 
between U.S. and foreign torture victims in the ATS and TVPA.257 
The lack of one, however, would bring equity and consistency for 
similar universally condemned acts, e.g., the United States highly 
regulates gold mining to prevent unnecessary and undue degradation, 
has enjoined and held gold mining operators liable for polluting water 
and destroying land, requires remediation of degraded areas,258 and 
has sought to prevent incompetent enforcement of U.S. 
environmental laws.259 Courts should follow the cue of the U.S. 
 
 254. Order to Show Cause Re Terminating Sanction, Mejia v. Dole Food Co., 
No. BC 340049, BC 379820, 2009 WL 1615826, at *6 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 11, 
2009); Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Supporting Order Terminating 
Mejia and Rivera Cases for Fraud on the Court, Mejia v. Dole Food Co. (Dole 
Termination Order), Nos. BC340049, BC379820, at 1 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 17, 
2009). Plaintiffs were coached to lie, and the law firms paid four Nicaraguan 
laboratories to fake results. Dole Termination Order, at 2–4, 38–39. The court 
sanctioned the plaintiffs and dismissed the claims entirely with prejudice. Id. at 58–
60.  
 255. See Dole Termination Order, at 5–6.   
 256. See supra text accompanying note 49; Bowen v. City of New York, 476 
U.S. 467, 484 (1986). 
 257. Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 890 (7th Cir. 2005) (Cudahy, J., 
dissenting in part). 
 258. E.g., California v. Gold Run Ditch & Mining Co., 4 P. 1152, 1154, 1159–60 
(Cal. 1884); Trustees for Alaska v. EPA, 749 F.2d 549, 558 (9th Cir. 1984); United 
States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 370, 373–74 (10th Cir. 1979); see 
United States v. Homestake Mining Co., 595 F.2d 421, 422 (8th Cir. 1979); Sierra 
Club v. Cripple Creek and Victory Gold Mining Co., No. 00 Civ. 02325, 2006 WL 
2882491, at *6–15 (D.Colo. 2006).  
 259. E.g., Trustees for Alaska, 749 F.2d at 561 (holding EPA erred in failing to 
require an effluent limitation for gold mining turbidity). But see Coeur Alaska v. 
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Supreme Court, which declined to impose a prudential exhaustion 
requirement for § 1983 suits because the policy considerations did 
not point in one direction and “vehement disagreement over the 
validity of the assumptions underlying many of them” suggests 
legislative action is preferable to judicial resolution.260   
D.  U.S. Courts Should Use International Abstention Instead or 
Modify the Sarei Exhaustion Analysis 
Instead of requiring exhaustion analysis, U.S. courts should (1) 
rely on existing doctrines like the international abstention doctrine to 
defer suit to only pending foreign litigation,261 or (2) modify the Sarei 
exhaustion doctrine to ensure adequate judicial review for very grave 
acts.262   
1.   U.S. Courts Should Defer to the Legislative Branch 
and Rely on Existing Doctrines, Such as Intentional 
Abstention 
The international abstention doctrine can perform the same goals 
as exhaustion in deferring to local courts that may have more 
expertise on sensitive legal issues while simultaneously better 
preserving issues and ensuring adequate judicial relief. International 
abstention is more appropriate because it guarantees access to justice 
as several courts have stayed rather than dismiss a U.S. suit.263 A stay 
is a more appropriate resolution of a parallel suit because U.S. courts 
can maintain “ample authority . . . to protect [the parties].”264 For 
 
Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 129 S. Ct. 2458, 2468–69 (2009) (holding gold 
mine tailings are “fill” that can receive just fill permit); Friends of Santa Fe Cnty. v. 
Lac Minerals, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 1333, 1342 (D.N.M. 1995) (holding gold mine 
overburden discharging toxic metals exempt from RCRA Subtitle C regulation). 
 260. See Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 513 (1982). 
 261. See infra Part V.D.1. 
 262. See infra Part V.D.2. 
 263. Royal & Sun Alliance Ins. Co. of Can. v. Century Int’l Arms, Inc., 466 F.3d 
88, 96 (2d Cir. 2006); Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 
1134, 1155 n.10 (citing Turner Entm’t Co. v. Degeto Film GmbH, 25 F.3d 1512, 
1523 (11th Cir. 1994)); see Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co. v. Granger, 833 F.2d 680, 
685 (7th Cir. 1987); Finova Capital Corp. v. Ryan Helicopters U.S.A., Inc., 180 
F.3d 896, 901 (7th Cir. 1999).  
 264. See Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 179 (1959) (involving Pullman 
abstention).  A stay may be required if a suit involves damages. Bush, supra note 
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example, the court in Johns Hopkins Health System Corp. retained 
jurisdiction because the foreign court proceeding was slow and 
missed an issue.265 Also, the court in Dole Food Co., Inc. v. 
Gutierrez266  retained jurisdiction because of likely false accusations 
of pesticide use injuries to banana workers.267 Under exhaustion, if 
the U.S. court were to make a determination of an adequate foreign 
court before all facts were uncovered, then it may inadvertently 
require exhaustion in a corrupt or otherwise inadequate judicial 
system. Stays are also crucial because U.S. courts may possibly 
dismiss ATS claims for res judicata or collateral estoppel if a foreign 
court reached a judgment or settled the facts or issues.268 Because the 
Supreme Court found that collateral estoppel applies to § 1983 
suits,269 it might apply res judicata and collateral estoppel principles 
to ATS suits. Yet, the Court mentioned an exception to res judicata 
and collateral estoppel when a court did not allow fair procedures for 
constitutional claims.270 Abstention is also superior to exhaustion 
because it even allows a U.S. court to issue a foreign anti-suit 
injunction271 if (1) a policy of the forum issuing the injunction would 
 
120, at 142–43 (discussing possible application of Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. 
Co., 517 U.S. 706 (1996) to international abstention cases). 
 265. 374 F. Supp. 2d 465, 475 (D. Md. 2005). 
 266. No. CV039416(PJWX), 2004 WL 3737123, at *6 (C.D. Cal. July 13, 2004). 
 267. Id.  
 268. See Goss Int’l Corp. v. Man Roland Druckmaschinen Aktiengesellschaft, 
491 F.3d 355, 366 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian 
World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1984)); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Ignacio 
Lopez de Arriortua, 948 F. Supp. 656, 669 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (citing Gau Shan Co., 
Ltd. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349, 1352 (6th Cir. 1992)); cf. Gordon G. 
Young, Federal Court Abstention and State Administrative Law from Burford to 
Ankenbrandt: Fifty Years of Judicial Federalism Under Burford v. Sun Oil Co. and 
Kindred Doctrines, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 859, 917–18 & nn.324–30 (1993). 
 269. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 105 (1980). 
 270. Id. at 101. 
 271. E.g., Answers in Genesis of Ky., Inc. v. Creation Ministries Int’l, Ltd., 556 
F.3d 459, 471–72 (2009) (upholding denial of a foreign anti-suit injunction because 
defendant was not trying to evade an important public policy of the U.S. forum and 
the parties had agreed to suspend the Australian proceedings); Albemarle Corp. v. 
AstraZeneca UK Ltd., No. 5:08-1085-MBS, 2009 WL 902348, at *6–8 (D.S.C. 
Mar. 31, 2009) (noting the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits generally grant 
foreign anti-suit injunctions while the First, Second, Sixth, and D.C. Circuits 
generally allow concurrent jurisdiction, unless possibly foreign action threatens the 
U.S. jurisdiction or important public policies of the forum suggest otherwise). 
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be frustrated, (2) the litigation would be vexatious or oppressive, (3) 
the issuing courts in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction would be 
threatened, or (4) other equitable considerations would be 
prejudiced.272  
Similar to U.S. courts’ use of abstention instead of exhaustion 
for § 1983 suits, U.S. courts should at least use international 
abstention instead of exhaustion for ATS suits in which the foreign 
State is the defendant or benefited by the defendant’s actions as those 
suits are most akin to the avoidance of state court resolution of § 
1983 suits where a state official is the defendant.273 
2.   If U.S. Courts Require Exhaustion for ATS Suits, the 
Doctrine Should Be Modified to Explicitly Consider 
the Gravity of Harm and Allow Stays and Equitable 
Tolling 
If U.S. courts apply a prudential exhaustion analysis to ATS 
suits, they should modify the Sarei test to clearly incorporate three 
facets. First, U.S. courts should clearly add a gravity part to the three-
part Sarei exhaustion analysis instead of the implicit consideration in 
the nexus part of the Sarei test or the obviously futile local remedies 
part of the Sarei test.274 Courts can use the gravity factor that the 
Ninth Circuit panel used when it temporarily established a prudential 
exhaustion requirement for FSIA claims.275 Second, U.S. courts 
 
 272. Albemarle Corp., 2009 WL 902348, at *6–8 (citing In re Unterweser 
Reederrei Gmbh, 428 F.2d 888, 890 (5th Cir. 1970), rev’d on other grounds, 407 
U.S. 1, 92 (1972) (granting anti-suit injunction that enjoined defendant from filing 
similar suit in English court)); see also SEC v. Pension Fund of Am., L.C., 613 F. 
Supp. 2d 1341, 1346–47 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (granting anti-suit injunction of later-filed 
Costa Rican suits to prevent interference with and evasion of the S.D. Fla 
proceedings).   
 273. Allen, 449 U.S. at 101, 105. 
 274. See supra notes 143–146, 164 and accompanying text. 
 275. Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 580 F.3d 1048, 1063–64 (9th Cir. 2009), 
rev’d, 616 F.3d 1019, 1037 (9th Cir. 2010) (reversed as not needing to reach the 
issue of a prudential exhaustion requirement). The fourth part of the panel’s test 
was:  
Finally, the court may, in its sound discretion, impose or waive exhaustion 
after assessing the availability, effectiveness, and possible futility of any 
unexhausted remedies in light of various prudential factors, including but 
not limited to: (1) the need to safeguard and respect the principles of 
comity and sovereignty, (2) the existence or lack of a significant United 
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should stay proceedings pending exhaustion instead of dismissing 
them. U.S. courts have stayed proceedings under the international 
abstention doctrine,276 the international comity doctrine,277 the 
Pullman278 abstention doctrine, and Professor Young has stated that 
the U.S. Supreme Court suggested it may be appropriate in some 
circumstances under the Burford279 abstention doctrine.280 U.S. courts 
have allowed stays in abstention of domestic environmental cases.281 
With a stay, a federal court can resolve issues if the other court did 
not decide the exact issue as presented.282 The Ninth Circuit’s order 
of mediation in this case while the court’s jurisdiction is being 
litigated provides an analogous example of how a stay may allow 
litigation to be peacefully resolved.283 Third, a U.S. court should 
apply equitable tolling if the ten-year statute of limitations would bar 
 
States ‘nexus,’ (3) the nature of the allegations and the gravity of the 
potential violations of international law, and (4) whether the allegations 
implicate matters of ‘universal concern’ for which a state has jurisdiction 
to adjudicate the claims without regard to territoriality or the nationality of 
the parties. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 276. See sources cited supra note 263. 
 277. Ungaro-Benages v. Dresdner Bank AG, 379 F.3d 1227, 1238 (11th Cir. 
2004) (citing Turner Entm’t Co. v. Degeto Film GmbH, 25 F.3d 1512, 1514 (11th 
Cir. 1994)). 
 278. Railroad Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941). 
 279. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). 
 280. Young, supra note 268, at 871 & n.61 (citing Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 401 
U.S. 37, 41 (1992)). 
 281. E.g., Holder v. Gold Fields Mining Corp., 506 F. Supp. 2d 792, 804–05 
(N.D. Okla. 2007) (finding state law claims might be stayed until an ongoing 
CERCLA investigation and remedial plan is completed to prevent conflict).      
 282. See Young, supra note 268, at 870. 
 283. See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 625 F.3d 561, 562 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) 
(“This case is referred to Judge Edward Leavy to explore the possibility of 
mediation. Judge Leavy is requested to report to the en banc court within twenty-
eight (28) days as to whether mediation should proceed or whether this case should 
be returned to the en banc court.”). Judge Reinhardt stated,  
While we are properly exercising our jurisdiction to decide, among other 
issues, whether we have jurisdiction here, we may take any non-
dispositive action we deem prudent or necessary . . . . If the mediation 
succeeds, we will simply have helped to resolve a complex legal dispute 
of great importance to the various litigants by means of a peaceful 
settlement rather than through extended litigation. 
Id. at 567, 568. 
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U.S. suit, especially for the time that an abusive government remains 
in power.284 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Before Congress, the Executive Branch, or international law 
clearly stated that nations, or the United States, should require 
exhaustion, a federal circuit court failed to yield to the policymaking 
branches in matters that have far-reaching and foreign policy 
implications. For the first time since 1789, plaintiffs bringing suit 
under the Alien Tort Statute face a requirement that they may have to 
first exhaust local remedies in the location where the tort occurred. 
The court’s complex three-part rule will greatly add to the duration 
and expense of litigation. Few acts qualify as violations of the “law 
of nations.” Five other foreign policy justiciability doctrines have 
adequately balanced the need to respect comity and to uphold 
customary international law and adjudicate grave violations of 
international law. By impeding adjudication of grave violations 
without clearly providing for equitable tolling and without 
opportunities for adequate adjudication prior to when res judicata and 
collateral estoppel might apply, the Sarei decision may actually 
obstruct any hope of recovery for low-income plaintiffs and 
unnecessarily cost defendants millions of dollars.   
In the meantime, U.S. courts should either rely on existing 
justiciability doctrines and let the politically accountable branches 
clearly establish an exhaustion requirement or modify the exhaustion 
analysis. To modify the exhaustion analysis, the courts should import 
a dispositive element for the gravity of the potential international law 
violations, stay U.S. proceedings to prevent foreign adjudications 
from precluding U.S. suits and to maintain equitable powers to ensure 
adequate judicial resolution, and import equitable tolling into the 
ATS to provide clear guidance that judicial relief will remain 
available for egregious acts. Without these modifications and 
clarifications, the exhaustion requirement may lead to greater world 
strife instead of achieving the statute’s purpose to maintain “the 
peace of the world,” as seen in Papua New Guinea’s long civil war 
 
 284. In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 286, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009); see text accompanying note 227. 
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arising from unremedied large-scale gold mining environmental 
damage. 
 
